The issue of the theory-ladenness of observation has long troubled philosophers of science, largely because it seems to threaten the objectivity of science. However, the way in which prior beliefs influence the perception of data is in part an empirical issue that can be investigated by cognitive psychology. This point is illustrated through an experimental analogue of scientific data-interpretation tasks in which subjects judging the covariation between personality variables based their judgments on pure data, their theoretical intuitions about the variables, (...) or both data and prior theoretical beliefs. Results showed that the perceived magnitude of correlations was greatest when subjects relied solely on theoretical intuitions; that data-based judgments were drawn in the direction of those prior beliefs; but that exposure to data nonetheless moderated the strength of the prior theories. In addition, prior beliefs were found to influence judgments only after a brief priming interval, suggesting that subjects needed time to retrieve their theoretical intuitions from memory. These results suggest ways to investigate the processes mediating theory-laden observation, and, contrary to the fears of positivist philosophers, imply that the theory-ladenness of observation does not entail that theoretical beliefs are immune to data. (shrink)

Susan Schneider argues that the entities to be identified as part of the 'physical base' for physicalism must be in part abstract and that this fact either falsifies physicalism or renders it so problematic as to be 'no physicalism worth having'. I accept the abstractness of the entities but argue both that physicalism is consistent with such and that none of the alleged problems for Platonistic physicalism are serious.

The latter half of the eighteenth century saw radical changes in the way nature - both external and human nature - was perceived. It is these new perceptions, these new images of the 'the natural' that this book examines: new appreciations of the 'sublime' wildness of landscape; new revelations by the life sciences of natural creative fecundity; new assertions of the innocence of 'natural man', as illustrated by the noble savage, the contented peasant, the happy family; a new sense of (...) harmony between man and nature, reflected in changing moral, psychological, economic, and religious attitudes. Professor Charlton concentrates on French examples, for in France the contrast between old and new views was particularly vivid; but there are also numerous comparisons with England and other European countries, making this a major study in the cultural history of Europe at an especially crucial time for the formation of many of our modem assumptions about man and nature. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity is widely used in contemporary ethics and law as a foundational criterion for moral reasoning. Nonetheless, the concept has recently received criticism from various quarters. Some of this criticism has come from representatives of the animal liberation movement. The concept of human dignity is accused of underpinning an ethics that is anthropocentric and speciesist. That is, human dignity is said to be used as the basis of an ultimately unjustifiable attribution of intrinsic moral worth only (...) to human beings and to lead, consequently, to a detrimental prejudice against other species. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “A First-Person Analysis Using Third Person-Data as a Generative Method: A Case Study of Surprise in Depression” by Natalie Depraz, Maria Gyemant & Thomas Desmidt. Upshot: Supplementing physiological measures with first-person data involves several benefits and challenges. The collection and analysis of the two types of data might not be optimal within the same procedural framework. Therefore, the synthesis of the two remains problematic.

Цель исследования - с феноменологических позиций рассмотреть процесс познания человеком своего бытия.

In her valuable book Hiding from humanity: Disgust, shame and the law, Nussbaum says that she reaches many of the same practical conclusions as Mill. But she argues that Mill’s conceptions of liberty, justice, and respect for rival ideas of the good and for religious belief, are defective, and further that they do not provide as adequate a basis for the form of political liberalism she recommends. Actually, the alleged defects in Mill rest largely on misrepresentations, but more importantly, once (...) one understands the central role of Mill’s account of justice in shaping his view of liberty and morality, it becomes clear that he offers a better response to cultural pluralism. His way of relating the morality and the aesthetics of conduct embodies a kind of respect for diversity both deeper and more realistic than that claimed for political liberalism. Mill brings a heritage from the Enlightenment in the light of which political liberalism looks like a failure of nerve. (shrink) -/- John Stuart Mill in 19th Century Philosophy Justice, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy. (shrink)

Originally published in 1972, this book is a systematic analysis of the objectives and methods of history teaching. The book considers the criticisms of the 1960s and 70s of history as a subject and the pressures for its replacement in the school curriculum. It examines the complex psychological background of learning history and suggests that historical understanding makes an important contribution to cognitive growth. It also stresses the important part played by historical material in the emotional and imaginative life of (...) the child. Concluding with a discussion of practical classroom methods, the author proposes objectives and characteristic concepts of the subject which may be embodied in all levels of teaching. (shrink)